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Abstract  
 
Sovereign default contagion in Eurozone has been under attention since the first 
problems in Greece at the end of 2009. Despite the improvements in the situation, in 
particular after several European Central Bank non- conventional monetary policy 
measures, the roots of the problem and policy prescriptions are still fiercely debated 
today. Using an agent-based model adapted from Tirole (2015), we simulate sovereign 
default contagion in a world where countries have random incomes, heterogeneous 
borrowing behaviors and risk aversion levels and where governments have the 
possibility to enter in ex-ante agreements to protect against default. We conclude that 
default contagion can be a very fast and ‘destructive’ process, higher spending countries 
tend to have lower disposable incomes and higher risk aversion levels are associated 
with lower default rates. 
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1 – INTRODUCTION  
Government bond yields in Eurozone countries were almost the same 
during the first ten years of European Monetary Union (EMU). This was, 
simultaneous, a surprising and a worrying behavior. Every country has 
virtually a German sovereign risk premium level, independently of its 
specific fundamentals, and investors consider it normal and price almost 
equally all the government bonds.  The financial crisis was a trigger to 
review this risk levels. Debt sustainability was questioned in many Eurozone 
countries after the first Greek problems in late 2009.  
Hesitations, sloppy reactions and very high debt-GDP ratios were the 
perfect ingredients to the financial turmoil that followed: four bailed-out 
countries (Portugal included), several new instruments created to 
strengthen EMU firepower against financial turbulence and a ‘real’ 
economy that still tries to recover several years after 2009´s Great 
Recession.   
On the main stage of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis debate were – and 
still are – two opposing political views about the nature and the solution of 
the problem.  It is a liquidity crisis that should be addressed by liquidity 
providing mechanism such as the ECB´s long-term refinancing operations or 
the more recent asset purchase program? Or, on the contrary, it is a 
solvency problem and countries should instead embark in fiscal tightening 
policies to assure the investors that debt will be fully payed? 
We have, on one corner, the ‘German’ vision – this is of course an 
oversimplification – defending fiscal consolidation and, on the opposite 
corner, the vision that austerity measures are self-defeating. In fact, this 
kind of sudden stop in debt markets has profound roots on the market 
sentiment but have also, of course, less immediate causes on the 
fundamentals of the economies. And it has also roots on the EMU design 
itself. Namely, the (in)existence of mechanisms to deal with this sort of 
turbulence and to cope with asymmetric shocks in general.   
Technicalities about the intervention mechanisms are, probably, the easiest 
part to deal with. The hardest part, in the multiple steps taken since 2010, 
was always to have enough agreement between all the governments. 
Because the diagnosis was often blurred by simplistic formulations such as 
creditors versus debtors; hard working countries versus lazy countries or 
spenders versus savers. Different concepts of guilt also play an important 
role in the debate: some countries believe that the ‘crisis countries’ are 
responsible for their own faith and should pay to avoid moral hazard; and 
other instead think that this is a systemic problem that must be addressed 
in a systemic way and not by simply putting all the effort in some countries.   
In fact, beyond further considerations about solidarity or Europeanism, 
there are good reasons for a country to share the risk of default of its 
neighbors. First, because it is probably affected by the default of its 
neighbor. This can happen directly - if the country (its companies, 
households or even public entities) is a net creditor of its neighbor – or 
indirectly by traditional economic and financial linkages.  
Even for very large and resilient economies, it is not very likely that a 'bad 
neighborhood' has no consequences at all. Financial and economic linkages, 
such as trade or investment (direct investment and portfolio investment), 
tend to be stronger for geographically closer countries.  
At the same time, frequently a region is seen from outside – large global 
investors, for instance - as an almost homogeneous block. The Asian crisis 
in late 90´s is a very good example of how financial turmoil can spread 
rapidly between neighbor countries, due precisely to the fact that large 
institutional investors – mutual funds, in particular – withdraw their 
investments in block from that region. 
The second good reason for sharing the default risk is the possibility to be 
bailed-out too, if necessary. This assistance mechanism can be an ad hoc 
solution or a predefined arrangement in which the necessary tools are 
always in place to be triggered. The European Union attitude towards the 
crisis have different phases and different solutions, which are a good 
illustration of the different options. The first Greek bail-out (2010) - when 
the financial envelope was gathered, in part, with bilateral loans from other 
countries – was an ad hoc solution but, after that, new instruments were 
created and now exists a permanent European bailout mechanism – the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
The flipside of the creation of these new mechanisms were further rules 
and economic conditionality (namely in terms of fiscal targets and 
structural reforms, inspired in International Monetary Fund programs). It is 
a normal feature in this kind of institutional arrangements and also a 
feature in current Eurozone fiscal policy rules. Because those who share the 
risk are interested not only in the 'selfish' view of paying a cost that, 
indirectly, could be their cost (by contagion). But also, because they want 
to have a word to say about the policies of their neighbor countries. Fiscal 
compact treaty in the euro area is an example of such requirements. 
In this paper, we will try to evaluate some of these questions within an 
agent-based model framework. Beginning with the crisis contagion - or 
serial defaults – and finishing with the institutional mechanisms and how 
they affect the contagion. We intend to analyze the problem in abstract 
terms, for different scenarios, and to draw some conclusions that may be 
useful in understanding some of the problems in Eurozone. 
The starting point is the model presented by Jean Tirole (Tirole, 2015) in 
which he tries to find optimal behavior of countries in this kind of situation. 
In particular, he attempts to determine the optimal strategies of countries 
and optimal contract design that maximizes utility in default scenarios for 
different frameworks. 
Our model is adapted from Tirole´s model. The idea is to simulate sovereign 
default and its contagion process for different institutional architectures, 
different prevalence of symmetric/asymmetric countries and different 
government attitudes towards spending.    
 
2 – RELATED LITERATURE  
Since 2007/2008 crisis, several articles were published addressing topics 
related with financial contagion using computational economics. 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to find examples of agent-based models or 
other computational tools dealing directly with sovereign default. Credit 
flows and financial system itself are the most frequent subjects.   
Steinbacher et al (2013), for example, used a network system to assess the 
credit contagion channel in financial markets and concluded that the effects 
are non-linear and shocks transmission depends heavily on the financial 
system structure and on the functioning of the interbank market. Zedda 
(2014) used simulations to test not only the ‘pure’ financial contagion but 
also the consequences for public finances and real economy, which he calls 
the “side effects" of systemic crises. Galliani and Zedda (2015) also look to 
the “vicious circle" between banks and public debt. They conclude that this 
is a “real threat” and that the shock tends to disappear only if the bank 
collapses are not severe or if the system is strong enough to absorb the 
impact. 
Klimek, Poledna, Farmer and Thurner (2015) used an agent-based model to 
simulate the bail-out and/or bail-in of distressed financial institutions in an 
environment where governments can choose between three alternatives: 
closing the bank, bail-in it or bail-out it. Simulations was performed in CRISIS 
macromodel.  
Bookstaber, Paddrik, and Tivnan (2014) simulate a fire sales scenario in 
order to understand the mechanism behind stop phenomena, for example. 
Bookstaber (2012) tested financial vulnerabilities.  
Caporale, Serguieva and Wu (2009) used ABM models to test different 
strategies in a financial crisis scenario. Simulations performed can be used 
to define parameter values and characteristics useful for early detection of 
financial contagion or powerful financial crisis. Caporale, Serguieva and Wu 
(2008) had already used an ABM model for simulating financial contagion.  
 
Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013) present a synthesis between ABM models 
and new-keynesian macroeconomics. In particular, they use a NK model 
mixed with financial markets ABM model features, namely the 
fundamentalist-chartist model.  
 
There are, in recent years, some examples in the literature about sovereign 
debt and fiscal policy simulation. But not about sovereign default, in 
particular. Raberto, Teglio and Cincotti (2011) use Eurace simulator to 
understand linkages between financial sector and economic performance. 
Thurner (2011) presents an extensive review about the use of ABM to 
evaluate and assess risks related with nation-level leverage and economic 
indicators. Pick and Anthony (2006) applied a simulation model to assess 
UK debt strategy. Gande and Parsley (2005) analyses the rating downgrades 
contagion on neighbor countries and it concludes that it is highly 
asymmetric: downgrades have negative impact; upgrades don’t have any.  
Another different stream of research targets financial contagion itself, away 
from simulation or ABM models. For instance, Allen and Gale (2000) 
presents one of the classic approaches to financial contagion through 
liquidity preference shocks. This kind of turbulence can be easily used to 
interpret sovereign debt crisis in Eurozone and the flight to quality 
phenomena experienced by countries like Portugal, Greece or Ireland in the 
run up to their respective bail-outs. 
On a more empirical basis, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) look to trade and 
financial links as contagion channels based on the data for 80 currency crisis 
between 1970 and 1998. In order to assess the role of international lending, 
cross-market hedging and trade, they find that contagion is a non-linear 
process and contagion channels are not always the same in different crisis.  
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) present a taxonomy of the financial 
crisis contagion based on specific examples, literature analysis and 
empirical results.  
Full understanding of traditional propagation mechanisms are also useful 
to anticipate crisis contagion, as done by Schimmelpfenning, Roubini and 
Manasse (2003). The three authors proposed a logit model and a binary 
recursive tree that are effective early warning mechanisms in, respectively, 
74% and 89% of the crisis.   
Some papers, like Lizarazo (2009), use a theoretical framework to evaluate 
crisis contagion, namely a DSGE model of default risk to identify 
endogenous foundations of the contagion. Theoretical results were in line 
with empirical evidence of Argentina-Uruguay contagion and suggested 
that: a) sovereign spreads and capital flows are correlated; b) economic 
fundamentals affect sovereign spreads and capital flows; and c) financing 
conditions in one economy are less favorable after other countries 
defaulted.  
Constâncio (2012) and Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) used credit-default 
swap (CDS) spreads in Eurozone to detect financial contagion. Constâncio 
argue that contagion played a more important role than fundamentals in 
sovereign debt crisis in EMU.  Kalbaska and Gatkowski concluded that 
contagion exists but it is different among countries and that Portugal is one 
of the most fragile economies.  
Mink and De Haan (2013) analyzed bank returns across Europe in response 
to news about Greece in 2010 and found that both news about Greek 
economy or Greek bailout had an impact. Beirne and Frarzscher (2013) 
found that, more than a contagion per se, sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
propagated across continent because economic agents – investors, in 
particular – decided to consider fundamentals in their decisions.   
Sudden stops literature is another useful field to consider when studying 
EMU debt crisis. In some aspects, flight to quality phenomena and external 
reluctance to maintain investments in some specific countries is a sudden 
stop phenomena. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) consider that the massive 
capital outflows of some Eurozone countries can be qualified as sudden 
stops and that demonstrates that balance of payment crisis are still possible 
in the context of a monetary union.  
Cavallo and Frankel (2008) used a gravity model for Latin America and find 
that openness is associated to less sudden stop and currency crashes risks. 
A result that is not applied to European countries but should be considered 
in any future institutional revisions.  
Other paper about sudden stops is Mendonza (2010) which explores the 
linkages between sudden stops and economic crisis looking to the role of 
the collateral constraints. It argues that this kind of phenomena has non-
linear and asymmetric features.  
Argentinian crisis is the object of Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) paper 
where the three authors offer an explanation of the collapse of peso-dollar 
peg based on a sudden stop problem.  Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) 
present an empirical analysis of sudden stop crisis based on a sample of 32 
developed and developing countries and concluded that sudden stops with 
large real exchange rate fluctuations are an emerging market phenomena 
and seem to come in bunches - grouping countries that are apparently 
different. Calvo (1998) presents the “simple economics of sudden stops”.  
In this paper, our aim is to simulate sovereign default contagion in a 
regional context where one country default has implications in its neighbors 
and where it is possible to establish ex-ante or ex-post agreements for risk 
sharing and for some kind of transfers and fiscal rules. An environment 
similar to the one faced by Eurozone.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 – THE MODEL  
This model is a version of Jean Tirole´s model with some modifications: a) 
Tirole´s model is a game theory model aiming to define optimal behaviors 
while our model intends to simulate contagion; b) Tirole´s model has only 
two countries, two periods and considers two different cases and our model 
have a large number of periods and different countries. 
The general dynamic of Tirole´s model is the following. In the scenario 
without ex-ante agreements (laissez-faire), country A (the Agent) decides 
how much to borrow () in period 1. In period 2, it has an income  and 
decides to pay an amount  of the loan. If this payment  is not the full 
repayment, the country has a penalty (or cost) 	which, in turn, indirectly 
affects the other country P (the Principal) in an amount  ( is a value 
between 0 and1). Income   depends on the state of nature and it is only 
observable by the country itself.  
In this general framework, the two countries can make bilateral agreements 
where both can have utility gains. In ex-ante agreements, country A, in 
exchange for a transfer		, commits to a contract that limits its borrowing 
level and determines a penalty for the case of partial or total default. In ex-
post agreements, after the state of nature materializes in period 2, country 
P transfers a value to assure the loan repayment. 
The model we intend to simulate is simpler than the original Tirole´s model 
but it is wider in terms of countries and periods. For example, in the original 
model country A chooses how much to repay and has a penalty based on 
that value. In our model, the country simply pays all or nothing and this 
action depends only on the income received. Governments don´t have the 
possibility of discretionary default and only default when they don´t have 
enough money to do it.  
The penalty of a default is being out of the markets until the ‘end of times’. 
This means that, after that period, this country have to live only with the 
income received and without the possibility of borrowing. Spillover effects 
of a default are a cost that depends on the number of countries in default.  
The main characteristics of our model are: 
• 
 countries  
•  small countries and (
 − ) large countries   
• Small countries have an income  = [
, 
] 
• Large countries have an income  = [
, 
] 
•  ≫ , which means that 
 > 
 
• Each country  borrows ,  in period  and pay ,  in period    
(it is assumed that each credit has a maturity of only one period) 
• ,	depends on the income , in period ; country pays all (if its 
income is enough) or nothing; strategic default is impossible   
•   depends on the state of nature: it has a value uniformly distributed 
in the intervals [!
, 
] and [
, 
], respectively for Small 
and Large countries (in the original model, income was  with 
probability α and 0 with probability (1-α)) 
• Countries have two different behaviors:  " are Spenders and (
 −
") are Savers regarding their borrowing levels 
• Borrowing is used to compensate income volatility in the intervals: 
Spenders compensate an higher part of the difference to maximum 
income (, = #	(
 − ,) ; Savers compensate a lower part 
(, = ∅(
 − ,) with 0 < ∅, # < 1 and # > & 
• When the 'neighbor' don´t pay, the country has a cost , with 
different R values for different countries based on the linear distance 
to the defaulting country. In the simplest form, the model considers 
 = 1 for all countries.     
In each period, countries decide how much to borrow but also if they want 
to enter in agreements. Ex-ante agreements transform Spenders in Savers, 
which means that default risk decrease in exchange of a transfer 	 (lower 
than ). Ex-ante agreements with Savers transform them in Ultra-Savers 
(with a lower borrowing parameter ' < ∅). When defaulting, countries 
with agreements are implicitly bailed-out and will keep on the markets 
borrowing normally.  
Countries can decide to engage in agreements in each period. Each country 
has a risk aversion level and, depending on it, it will decide whether or not 
to protect against default. Higher risk-averse countries decide to enter in 
agreements when their income is lower than the midpoint of the income 
interval for the first time. Low risk-averse countries have a higher threshold 
(3/4 of the interval).  
The cost of agreements, i.e. the transfers made to participant countries, are 
equally divided by all the remaining countries. In our simpler form, this cost 
is not imputed to any country, but this doesn´t change the general 
conclusions.  
 
4 – SIMULATION  
For the simulation, we considered 100 periods and 20 different countries. 
It is an arbitrary choice that can be, of course, changed. Our goal is to 
generate sufficient decisions and interactions between countries to 
artificially create an environment of sovereign default contagion.  
In each of these 100 periods, each country receives an income ,  randomly 
generated in two different intervals [10,20] and [25,50], respectively for 
Small and Large countries. Countries with individual income lower than the 
sum of previous period debt and contagion cost of other countries default 
enter, themselves, in default. This means that they will be out of market 
until the last period, living only with their ‘natural income’ randomly 
generated.   
However, countries with an agreement – that imposes a limit on their 
borrowing – may default in financial terms (their income being lower than 
their financial needs) but stay in the market normally. For the sake of 
simplicity, there are no creditors of this debt, which is the same of saying 
that there is no financial system supplying funds to the countries. This is a 
research avenue for future developments of this paper. In this stage, the 
only financial consequence of a default for neighbor countries is the impact   
 of each default and this impact is the same for Small and Large countries. 
This means that, for a constant contagion cost, Small countries suffer most.   
After that, the countries that are not in default or don´t have previous 
agreement, decides if they want to enter an agreement –exchanging a 
transfer 	 for a more frugal behavior. Only then, the country will decide how 
much to borrow depending on their specific spending stance.  
In simple terms, the process is divided in four basic steps:  
1) Countries have an income ,  
2) Income is compared with previous period borrowing (,( ) added 
to default contagion impact (measured by the sum of 	factor divided 
by the numbers of countries not in default; we are assuming that 
countries in default have already enough impact). If income is 
enough, country pays. Otherwise, the country will default which 
means that, if it has no prior agreement, it will be out of the markets 
forever.  
3) Countries that are not in default and have no previous agreement 
decide if they want to adopt one. This decision depends on their 
individual risk aversion level – that determines a specific threshold to 
trigger a decision – and on their income.  
4) Countries decide how much to borrow and this decision depends on 
their propensity to borrow. Borrowing is used to compensate income 
volatility. In practice, they borrow an amount depending on the 
distance between current income and maximum possible income. 
Spenders have a larger borrowing parameter while Savers have a 
lower parameter. Countries with ex-ante agreements change their 
behavior: Spenders become Savers and Savers become Ultra-savers.       
 
4.1 Scenarios and parameters  
Simulation was performed for four different scenarios. All have the same 
number of periods (100) and countries (20) but different partitions in terms 
of Small/Large countries, Spenders/Savers and High/Low risk averse 
countries. Agreement transfer (	) and contagion cost () are set, 
respectively, to 10 and 100. Borrowing parameters are set to 1, 0.9 and 0.5, 
respectively for Spenders, Savers and Ultra-savers.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the four scenarios:  
 
Table 1 – Simulation scenarios 
SCENARIO  P N L X R g s u τ c 
Baseline 
20 100 
5 10 5 
1 0.9 0.5 10 100 
2 2 10 5 
3 5 5 5 
4 5 10 10 
Note: Scenario 2 have less large countries (2); Scenario 3 have less spenders (5); Scenario 4 have higher risk    
aversion (10) 
 
In Baseline scenario we have 5 Large countries, 10 Spenders and 5 High-risk 
averse countries. The other three scenarios are variations among these 
three dimensions. Scenario 2 depicts a world with less Large countries (2 
instead of 5). Scenario 3 have less Spenders (5 instead of 10) and Scenario 
4 have more High risk aversion countries (10 instead of 5).  
To evaluate economic performance, we compute individual country 
disposable income per period ()*,)	that is simply the difference between 
receipts (income, borrowing and agreement transfers) and spending 
(previous debt and financial impact of defaults). It is given by the following 
expression for country  in period : 
)*, =	, +	, − ,( + 	 −
*( . 
(
 − *( )
 
 
where *(   is the number countries defaulting in period t-1 and the other 
variables are the same used previously.   
 
6. RESULTS 
Several conclusions can be drawn regarding sovereign default propagation 
and income volatility in a world with different countries and different 
behaviors towards borrowing. Baseline scenario results provide very 
interesting and revealing results.  
First, average income is highly volatile, which is a direct result of its own 
nature – it is randomly generated – and to the fact that countries change 
their borrowing attitudes after defaulting or after an agreement. This can 
be easily seen in Figure 1 that depicts the evolution of the average 
disposable income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Baseline: average income 
 
 
 
Second, Large countries have larger average incomes. That is normal 
considering that, by definition, large countries have always larger incomes, 
as we can see in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – Baseline: large versus small countries  
 
 Third, defaults have harsh consequences for disposable income and, in this 
particular, agreement countries performed better. After the first defaults, 
default countries average income tends to decrease very fast while 
agreement countries have a relatively stable income. Figure 3 depicts this 
opposing pattern.  
 
Figure 3 – Baseline: default versus agreement countries  
 
 
 
Four, Savers tend to have higher disposable incomes. This must be analyzed 
in further detail before definitive conclusions. But it is probably due to the 
fact that Savers have lower default rates and can stay in the market 
borrowing normally. On the contrary, Spenders tend to have earlier 
defaults with consequences for their future income. This pattern can be 
easily recognized in Figure 4.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Baseline: spenders versus savers 
 
 
In the Baseline Scenario, all countries default during the 100 periods time 
span. In the example presented in Figure 5, it happens between periods 30 
and 40. This acceleration is, precisely, the contagion effect.    
 
Figure 5 – Baseline: number of defaults  
 
 
6.1 Scenario comparison  
 
Economic performance of Scenario 3 surpasses, clearly, all the others. It has 
a simple explanation: less Spenders are associate with lower default levels 
and contagion, so more countries stay in the market borrowing normally.  
On the other extreme, Scenario 2 has the lowest average income. It has less 
Large countries which have a direct scale effect. All the average disposable 
incomes for the four scenarios is depicted in Figure 6.   
 
 
Figure 6 – Scenarios average income performance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 – CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this paper we simulate sovereign default contagion in an environment 
where countries have random incomes and different borrowing behaviors 
and risk aversion levels. Countries can decide to enter in ex-ante 
agreements with other countries in order limit their borrowing in exchange 
for a transfer and a hedge against default.  
The model was based on Jean Tirole´s (Tirole, 2015) framework, with some 
extensions and departures. In particular, we considered a larger number of 
countries and periods as well as modifications in the borrowing procedure 
and in the contagion process.  
The main conclusions are:  
a) higher risk aversion is associated with lower default levels but also 
with lower disposable incomes 
b) countries with higher propensity to borrow (Spenders) tend to have 
lower average disposable incomes  
c) agreements are an obvious good option, in terms of average income  
d) default contagion is a very rapid process and can affect all the 
countries in a small number of periods  
This work is only a first step to simulate sovereign default contagion. Several 
improvements can be made in the future along two main roads of research. 
First, the model specification itself. For example: improving the contagion 
process to consider bilateral distance between countries or even more 
complex bilateral relations based on economic ties; consider different 
contagion effect for large and small countries; consider time-depending risk 
aversion or other time-depending variables.  
The second road of improvement is related to the perimeter of the model 
– introducing a banking sector as the creditor of the countries, for instance 
- and with the introduction of external shocks – to simulate financial crises 
periods for example.  
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